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Do Firms Sell Forward for Strategic Reasons? 





Building on a model of the interaction of risk-averse firms that compete in forward and spot 
markets, we develop an empirical strategy to test whether oligopolistic firms use forward 
contracts for strategic motives, for risk-hedging, or for both. An increase in the number of 
players weakens the incentives to sell forward for risk-hedging reasons. However, if strategic 
motives are also relevant, then an increase in the number of players strengthens the incentives 
to sell forward. This difference provides the analyst with a way to identify whether strategic 
considerations are important at motivating firms to sell forward. Using data from the Dutch 
wholesale market for natural gas where we observe the number of players, spot and forward 
sales, and churn rates, we find evidence that strategic reasons play an important role at 
explaining the observed firms’ (inverse) hedge ratios. In addition, the data lend support to the 
existence of a learning effect by wholesalers. 
JEL-Code: D43, L13, G13, L95. 
Keywords: market power, risk-hedging, forward contracts, spot market, over-the-counter 
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Electricity and gas industries used to consist of vertically integrated monopolies, state-owned
or not, operating under regulatory constraints. In each country or region there was a single
monopolistic importer in place, which typically owned the transmission network and either
sold directly to consumers or to downstream distribution monopolies. One-to-one negotia-
tions was the standard of trade throughout the value chain and the dierent parties were
typically subject to long-lasting contractual relationships.
Short- and long-run eciency considerations have led energy policy makers worldwide to
gradually restructure energy markets. A key feature has been the vertical separation of
production and transportation activities. This separation has enabled the creation of spot
commodity markets. The Pool in the UK, ISO in California, the real-time PJM market in
Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland, ERCOT in Texas, EPEXSPOT in Austria, France,
Germany and Switzerland are examples in electricity; NBP in the UK, the Henry Hub in the
US, the Zeebrugge Hub in Belgium and TTF in The Netherlands are examples in natural
gas.
The 2000-2001 electricity crisis in California has revealed that the combined prevalence of
price risks and market power in energy markets may have fatal consequences when risk-
hedging mechanisms are absent (Bushnell, 2004). As a consequence, in nowadays restruc-
turing, it is widely held that spot markets must necessarily be complemented with forward
markets (Ausubel and Cramton, 2009). In an attempt to aid rms to contract forward,
platforms have been created where property rights can more easily be transferred among
the participants.1 In addition, in some markets we have witnessed the creation of futures
exchanges. Examples of markets for electricity futures are CALPX in California and EEX
Power Derivatives in Austria, France, Germany and Switzerland; ENDEX runs a market
for natural gas futures in The Netherlands, as well as markets for UK and Dutch electricity
futures.
Facilitating forward transactions has the potential to deliver social benets on two accounts.
First, forward markets address the need of a rm to hedge risks. Forward contracts typically
specify xed delivery prices so risk-averse market participants can mitigate their exposure
to price shocks in the spot market by acquiring a portfolio of futures. Central results in the
literature relate to the decisions of a competitive risk-averse rm facing price uncertainty
(see e.g Baron, 1970; Holthausen, 1979; and Sandmo, 1971). In the absence of a futures
market, this type of rm turns out to restrict its output relative to what the rm would
produce under certainty. The opening of a forward market restores the level of output that
would prevail if uncertainty were removed.
1One development in natural gas has been the creation of virtual hubs, for example the NBP and TTF,
as opposed to the more traditional physical hubs, like the Henry Hub and the Zeebrugge Hub. A physical
hub is a location where several pipelines come together, so that total physical throughput is delivered at this
point. By contrast, virtual hubs contain several entry and exit points that are interconnected, which implies
that not all the gas traded has to ow through a single point in the pipeline system.
2Forward markets can deliver further social benets in situations where rms wish to sell
forward for strategic reasons. In their inuential paper, Allaz and Vila (1993) show that
forward contracts confer competitive advantages to Cournot rms so, even when there is no
uncertainty at all about future market conditions, rms have incentives to engage in forward
trading. By selling futures contracts at a pre-specied price, a rm ends up attaching a
lower value to a high spot market price. As a result, a rm that sells forward is indirectly
committing to an aggressive behavior in the spot market. This raises rm protability, since
competitors respond by adopting a compliant spot market strategy. Selling forward exhibits
however the characteristics of a prisoner's dilemma. Because every seller has incentives to
sell (part of) its output forward, the resulting equilibrium aggregate production is higher
(and the price lower) than in the absence of a futures market.2
To the best of our knowledge, whether the forward market institution by itself is successful
on these two fronts at a time is not well understood yet. One obvious reason for this lack
of knowledge is that a great deal of the contracts we have observed in gas and electricity
markets has not been dictated by market forces but imposed by the regulators in the form
of gas release programs or vesting electricity contracts (Borenstein, 2002; Wolfram, 1999).
A second reason is that disentangling the two rationales motivating rms to sell forward
{strategic commitment and risk-hedging{ from the eld data is, at least, methodologically
challenging; in addition, it requires a wealth of data on forward transactions. In this paper
we propose an empirical strategy to separate the various incentives behind the contract cover
of a rm and we apply it to the Dutch natural gas market.
Our methodology to test whether rms use forward contracts for strategic reasons and/or for
risk-hedging motives builds on the idea that commitment has value only if it is (imperfectly)
observable (Allaz and Vila, 1993; Kao and Hughes, 1997). Inspired from this idea, we develop
a model of the interaction of asymmetric risk-averse rms that compete in a forward market
before they set quantities in a spot market. The key aspect of the modelling is that it
introduces the extent to which forward positions are observable (or correctly inferred from
the forward price) as a structural parameter that can be estimated provided there is variation
in the number of participating rms.
In real-world energy markets, it is reasonable to assume that rivals' forward positions may be
dicult to observe. First, where they exist, markets for natural gas and electricity futures are
designed to be anonymous and this anonymity puts impediments for the forward positions
of each individual rival rm to be observed with a reasonable precision. Second, even if
in principle observation of the forward price may help rms to infer the rivals' aggregate
forward position, the process of (forward) price discovery is far from simple. This is because
some (or all) of the transactions in these markets are made over the counter (OTC) as
organized exchanges are often bypassed by the traders or totally lacking. OTC markets are
relatively non-transparent and price indices for these markets, typically provided by broker
associations of by specialized agencies, are based on a limited pool of recent transactions.
2The model of Allaz and Vila has been adapted to suit the particular organization of power markets in
the UK by von der Fehr and Harbord (1992), Powell (1993), Newbery (1998) and Green (1999).
3By construction, price indices are complex statistics so it is unclear how much a participant
in the market can learn about rivals' deviations from equilibrium play. Even if centralized
futures markets are more transparent, seen that arbitrage opportunities across the exchanges
and the OTC markets are not always fully exhausted, the existence of conicting price signals
(as the law of one price fails) further troubles the quality of the inferences market participants
can make (see e.g. Anderson, Hu and Winchester, 2007; Bushnell, 2007).
Our model bridges between the extreme cases of full transparency (perfect observability of
rivals' forward positions) and complete opacity of the forward market (no observability at
all). By doing so, the model gains in exibility to t the data and helps us understand the
extent to which the forward market provides the players with commitment possibilities.
We show how to estimate the model using data on total sales, forward sales, churn ratios and
numbers of producers and wholesalers. Identication of the key parameter requires variation
in the number of active wholesale rms. In our data this variation comes from entry of new
players in the market but in other studies the analyst could exploit variation in the number
of producers and wholesalers across regional/separated markets. The empirical test exploits
the eect that changes in the number of players has on the so-called inverse hedge ratio
{dened as the total-to-forward-sales ratio.3 Interestingly, for the linear model this ratio is
independent of demand intercept and marginal cost so rms with similar aversion to risk
hedge in the same way no matter their marginal costs of production and the state of the
demand.
In a nutshell, the identication arguments are as follows. The incentives of a rm to trade
forward are shaped by three forces. The rst two, the risk-hedging eect and the strategic
eect, are pro-contracts. The third is a price eect that arises because oering forward
contracts lowers the spot price and, by arbitrage, the forward price too. This price eect
actually puts a downward pressure on rm's (expected) prots and therefore makes forward
contracting less attractive.
When the forward market is relatively opaque so that players have a dicult time to infer
deviations from equilibrium play, the strategic eect is hardly present and the contract cover
of a rm is the outcome of trading o the risk-hedging eect against the price eect. In
that situation, as the number of competitors rises, the residual demand of an individual
rm becomes less susceptible to demand shocks. Therefore, the incentive to hedge becomes
weaker if more suppliers enter the market. The price eect, by contrast, stays constant if
the number of suppliers in the market increases. As a result, by virtue of the rst force, the
inverse hedge ratio increases in the number of competitors.
By contrast, if the forward market is relatively transparent so that price and/or rival rms'
forward positions are regularly and precisely observed, in addition to the risk-hedging and
the price eects, the strategic eect plays a signicant role. This strategic eect turns out to
be stronger as more players are around. This is because the (marginal) gains from aecting
3To be precise, inverse hedge ratio = (spot sales + forward sales) / forward sales .
4the rivals' spot market strategy rise with the number of competitors. We show that the
strategic eect may have a dominating inuence in which case inverse hedge ratios turn
out to be decreasing in the number of rms. This dierent impact of the number of rms
on inverse hedge ratios in case forward positions can correctly be forecasted by the market
participants constitutes the source of identication of the strategic eect.
We estimate the model using data from the Dutch wholesale market for natural gas. In
contrast to restructured markets elsewhere, the Dutch natural gas market is one where futures
contracts have not been forced upon the producers and wholesalers by the regulator. This is
important because otherwise it is dicult to learn whether the market by itself provides the
players with the necessary hedging and commitment opportunities. Our data set consists of
a fairly large fraction of all (forward, spot and speculative) trades conducted at the Dutch
gas hub Title Transfer Facility (TTF), from April 2003 until June 2008.4 We use information
on churn rates (i.e. information on the fraction of speculative trades) to construct the inverse
hedge ratios concerning the actual deliveries of natural gas. The model imposes a restriction
on the inverse hedge ratios which, using variation on number of producers and wholesalers,
can be estimated. The main empirical nding is that strategic considerations cannot be
discarded as an explanation for the observed (inverse) hedge ratios. Seen under the light
that most of the forward transactions occur OTC and therefore the forward market we study
can initially be regarded as relatively non-transparent, we think this is an important result.
Moreover, we document a learning eect, which we relate to the rapid development of (gross
and net) volumes traded at the TTF. By contrast, we do not nd signicant evidence that
risk-hedging is important in this market. We discuss the possible explanations for this result
later.
Our paper contributes to the literature that studies forward contracting of (essentially) non-
storable goods.5 Allaz (1992) and Allaz and Vila (1993) show that not only risk-hedging is
important for rms to sell contracts in Cournot markets. Kao and Hughes (1997) discuss
the role of the observability-of-forward-positions assumption. Mahenc and Salani e (2006)
demonstrate that selling forward may have anticompetitive eects when rms compete in
prices. Ferreira (2003) also encounters anticompetitive eects when rms are able to sell
in a futures market at innitely many moments prior to the opening of the spot market.6
Our model extends previous work by examining an n-rm game with risk-averse players
that are heterogeneous in their marginal costs of production and in their aversion to risk.
We explore two variants of the model, one where rms observe demand shocks before the
spot market opens, and one where the spot market remains uncertain. Although we cannot
nd closed-form solutions for the forward and spot sales of an individual rm, we derive its
4The TTF is a virtual market place that oers market participants the possibility to buy and sell gas
that is already injected into the Dutch gas transmission grid, or for which transportation capacity is already
booked.
5Natural gas can be stored more easily than electricity but the costs of doing so are relatively high, so
that for its most part production, delivery and consumption take place contemporaneously.
6See also Newbery (1998) and Green (1999), who study models where rms compete in the spot market
using supply schedules. These papers show that, owing to the multiplicity of equilibria in supply functions,
the optimal contract cover of a rm is intimately linked to the spot market equilibrium actually played.
5equilibrium (mean) inverse hedge ratio. These ratios turn out to have similar properties, the
most important for our purposes that they fall in the number of players when the forward
market is suciently transparent.
Our paper also adds to a growing empirical literature on the eects of forward contracting
on spot market strategies and energy market outcomes (Green, 1999; Wolak, 2000; Fabra
and Toro, 2005; Horta csu and Puller, 2008; Bushnell, Mansur and Saravia, 2008). These
papers have focused on electricity markets where forward contracts have often been imposed
by regulators and can therefore be considered exogenous to the equilibrium process. By
contrast, we deal with a market where forward contracts are endogenous. Our results lend
support to the idea that the market may by itself provide the necessary incentives to the
rms to engage in a healthy amount of forward contracting.
There is also work that has focused on forward and spot price dierences in energy markets.
Longsta and Wang (2004) document signicant risk-premia in electricity forward prices.
Bessembinder and Lemmon (2006) derive the equilibrium forward risk premium in a compet-
itive model of the interaction of producers and retailers in the absence of speculators. Our
paper diers from theirs in that our producers have market power. This allows us to address
the issue of whether they sell futures contracts to hedge or to gain market power in the spot
market.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a two-period model of
competition. In the rst period, the forward market opens and rms sell futures contracts. In
the second period, the spot market opens, rms sell quantities and delivery of all contracted
and spot quantities takes places. This section also presents the main empirical prediction
of our model. We take it to the data in Section 4. Before that, Section 3 discusses in some
detail the institutions of the Dutch wholesale gas market. The paper closes with a discussion
of the main results, some extensions and variations of the basic model and some concluding
remarks.
2 A model of forward and spot contracting
Consider an oligopolistic market with n asymmetric risk-averse rms selling a homogeneous
good. Firms are asymmetric on two accounts: they dier in their degree of risk-aversion
and have dierent marginal costs of production. Firms can sell output in the spot market;
7An alternative, and complementary, approach to address this issue is to use controlled experiments. In
a recent paper, Brandts, Pezanis-Christou and Schram (2008) set up laboratory experiments to study the
eciency eects brought about by the possibility of forward contracting. Working with deterministic demand
and cost parameters, risk-hedging can be, if not fully eliminated, at least signicantly reduced. Brandts et
al. observe that signicant price decreases and eciency gains are obtained compared to the case in which
only spot market trading is possible. Additional experimental evidence on the pro-competitive eects of
futures contracts is provided by Coq and Orzen (2006). Ferreira, Kujal and Rassenti (2009) challenge this
view and present experimental evidence to suggest that forward contracts make collusion more likely. Their
results are in line with Liski and Montero (2006).
6in addition, they can also sell (or buy) the good in a forward market.8 Let si and xi be,
respectively, rm i's total spot and forward market sales; the total output rm i supplies
on the market will be denoted qi(= si + xi). The marginal cost of production of a rm i is
denoted ci.9
We assume that market demand is random and given by the linear-normal specication




i=1 qi denotes the aggregate output delivered to consumers and  is a zero-
mean random shock normally distributed with standard deviation :10 We assume that the
realization of  is observed when the spot market opens.11 At that stage, a rm i chooses its
spot sales si to maximize its spot market prots.12
At the forward market stage, by contrast, rms are uncertain about the price that will
prevail in the market. As a result, at that stage, a rm views its monetary ow of prots as
a random variable. We assume rms are risk averse and have constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) utility functions. Let i be the realized (forward and spot) monetary prots of a
rm i. The utility function of a rm i is u(i) =  e ii, where i > 0 denotes rm i's
degree of risk aversion.13 Denote by F(i) the distribution of the monetary prots i of a
rm i. (Note that this distribution is endogenous and will be determined later.) Then a rm
8Forward contracts are contracts traded in the OTC market, while futures contracts change hands in
centralized exchanges. Since both types of contracts serve the same objectives, we use them interchangeably
throughout the paper.
9In the natural gas industry, on the supply side of the market we typically encounter producers and whole-
salers. The constant marginal cost assumption is probably a good approximation for the costs of extraction
and shipping incurred by producers. European wholesalers typically import gas from producing countries
such as Norway and Russia. Wholesalers have long-term take-or-pay contracts with foreign producers. Take-
or-pay contracts stipulate that the buyer pays for a pre-specied minimum amount of gas, irrespective of
whether the gas is actually taken (Masten and Crocker, 1985). Take-or-pay contracts also include a variety of
(daily and yearly) exibility clauses (Asche et al., 2002; IEA, 2002). These clauses provide wholesalers with
the necessary exibility to adjust supply to demand shocks. Take-or-pay contracts are typically indexed to
the oil price so the constant marginal cost assumption is also reasonable. Moreover, because wholesalers book
import capacity assuming extreme weather conditions, transport capacity is typically not binding. Pipelines
also allow for line-pack, that is, for the increase in the amount of gas the system can carry by temporarily
raising its pressure.
10Even though producers and wholesalers may dier in that the latter face both price and cost risk, in
what follows we will not make a distinction between their economic problems. Note also that in our linear
model randomness of the demand is equivalent to randomness on the marginal cost.
11This assumption is not necessary. It reects the idea that rms are typically well informed about the
state of the demand when the spot market opens and use such a market to balance their portfolios. Later in
Section 4 we develop the case in which at the spot market stage rms are still uncertain about the realization
of . The main theoretical insights of the model generalize to such case (see Proposition 2); in addition, our
estimates do not depend on this modeling choice (see Tables 5, 6 and 7).
12In our application, the demand side of the market is made of domestic retailers and exporting shippers.
We do not model risk aversion on the demand side because retail prices in the Netherlands and the sur-
rounding countries are non-regulated and a great deal of the retail contracts have variable prices (see e.g.
von der Fehr and Hansen, 2010).
13The case of risk-neutrality obtains when i ! 0 for all i.





For simplicity, future spot market prots are not discounted.14
Next, and central to our paper, we assume that whether rms observe each other's forward
positions is uncertain. To model this idea, we introduce a Bernoulli random variable, denoted
I, with parameter . If I = 1 forward positions become observable to the players and then
we get the standard Allaz and Vila (1993) setting. By contrast, if I = 0 we obtain the case of
unobservable forward trading, as discussed by Kao and Hughes (1997).15 The parameter 
can then be interpreted as the degree of transparency of the forward market. As mentioned
in the Introduction, another, and perhaps more compelling, interpretation of this parameter
is that it reects the ability of rms to infer deviations from the equilibrium path by looking
at forward price changes.16 One objective of the paper is to estimate the Bernoulli parameter
.
We further assume there is a fringe of outside speculators. These traders, which are assumed
to be risk-neutral, do not have transmission capacity rights so they cannot physically deliver
the commodity to the nal customers. Speculators compete  a la Bertrand for the quantities
oered in the forward market. We shall also assume that pure nancial traders observe
sellers' deviations from the equilibrium path. This assumption is based on the idea that
speculators take positions that increase their exposure to risk in an attempt to (weakly)
increase their wealth. As such, they have perhaps the strongest incentives to follow upon the
forward market developments. For the model at hand, this assumption implies that a strong
version of arbitrage (o and on the equilibrium path) between forward and spot markets
holds.17
14As it will become clear later, monetary prots are not normally distributed so maximizing (2) is not
equivalent to maximizing the corresponding mean-variance specication. We also worked with mean-variance
utility functions and the results obtained were similar.
15We model imperfect observability by assuming that rms either observe the (correct) forward price or
they miss it altogether. An alternative way to model imperfect observability is by assuming that rms may
observe forward prices that are wrong. In that case Bagwell (1995) shows that the value of commitment is
fully destroyed; van Damme and Hurkens (1997) show that Bagwell's striking result relies on an unnecessary
restriction to pure strategies.
16Forward markets are to some extent opaque. Many transactions occur over the counter and therefore are
invisible to market participants. Forward price indices are published by brokers and specialized information
agencies. Firms may be able to infer rivals' forward positions upon observation of those indices but the
question is how well. We can think of  as the fraction of times the rms are able to forecast how deviations
from the equilibrium forward sales will aect the spot market price. In this sense, rms can be seen as been
ignorant, or naive, 1    of the times.
17Ferreira (2006) studies the role of the observability assumption at length. He argues that it is hard to
reconcile the assumption that rms are not informed of the rivals' forward positions with the assumption
that speculators observe deviations at the forward stage. As mentioned earlier, in the real-world forecasting
quantities sold upon observing forward price indices is far from trivial, specially if rms are heterogeneous.
Speculators are not gamblers but highly specialized investors whose prot critically depends on the quality
of the forecasts they make.
8The timing of the game is as follows. In the rst stage, rms put quantities in the forward
market. Then the Bernoulli variable I is realized and forward positions become observable
or not. Next, rms learn the demand shock . Finally, rms compete in quantities in the
spot market and total sales are delivered. We now solve the game by backward induction.
2.1 Spot market stage
At the time the spot market opens, demand is certain and rm i chooses its spot sales si to
maximize its spot market prots:

s
i = (p   ci)si (3)
where p is the realized spot market price given in (1). For this, a rm i takes the spot market
strategies and, when observed, the forward positions of the rival rms as given. In case of an
opaque forward market, rm i makes a conjecture about the forward sales of its competitors.
18 The spot market equilibrium turns out to be in linear strategies. Putting the linearity of
the strategies up front, we write the spot market strategy of a rm i as:
si = Ai + Bi; i = 1;:::;n: (4)
When I = 1, which occurs with probability , rms observe each other forward positions.
In that case, the realization of the spot market price can be written as:
p = a + (1   b
n X
j6=i
Bj)   bxi   b
n X
j6=i






j6=1 xj is the sum of the actual forward positions of rm i's competitors. Prot




(a + (1   b
n X
j6=i



















Therefore, conditional on the forward positions being observable, the equilibrium spot market




a +  +
Pn





and the equilibrium spot market price equals:
p
I=1 =
a +  +
Pn





18We require the conjectures to be correct in equilibrium.






2 + (f   ci)xi (10)
where f denotes the forward price.
When I = 0, which occurs with probability 1   , rms do not observe each other's actions
in the forward market. This implies that deviations of a rm i from the equilibrium path go
undetected by the rival players. In that case, the price in the spot market is given by:
p = a + (1   b
n X
j6=i
Bj)   bxi   b
n X
j6=1






j6=i ^ xj is rm i's conjecture about the rivals' aggregate forward position. The rst
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Because rm i does not observe deviations from the conjectured (equilibrium) forward sales
of the rival rms, its spot market strategy is only aected by (a change in) its own forward
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As a result, conditional on the forward positions not being observed, the spot market sales




a +  +
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and the realized market price:
p
I=0 =
a +  + ci +
Pn











2 + (f   ci)xi: (16)
2.2 Forward market stage
At the forward market stage, rms sell (or buy) part of their total output in the futures
market to maximize their expected utility.19 Note that u(i) = Iu(I=1
i ) + (1   I)u(I=0
i ).
19We do not a priori restrict rms' level of forward trading to be positive. However, in equilibrium each
rm will sell a non-negative amount in the forward market.
10Using the expressions for the conditional prots derived above, the expected utility of rm










where f() is the density function of the normal distribution with zero mean and variance
given by 2.
A rm i picks its amount of forward sales xi to maximize its expected utility. It is instructive




































f()d = 0 (18)
In equilibrium ^ xi = xi for all i and so is I=1
i = I=0
i = i and @I=1
i =@xi = @I=0
i =@xi =

































































The rst term of this equation (after the integral sign) represents marginal utility from
(monetary) prot, while the term between parentheses is the marginal monetary prot from
selling futures contracts. A rm i chooses its amount of futures xi to make the expected
value of the product of marginal utility and marginal monetary prot equal to zero.
The incentives of a rm i to sell forward are shaped by three forces. There is a risk-hedging
eect, a strategic eect and a price eect. The rst two forces are pro-contracts; the third
one dampens the incentives to sell futures. These three forces can actually be seen after
taking a closer look at equation (19). To see them more clearly, it is useful to consider the
two extreme cases of complete opacity ( = 0) and complete transparency ( = 1) of the
forward market.
11When forward positions cannot be observed by the rivals the strategic eect is absent and

























f()d = 0 (20)
In parenthesis we see the direct eect of selling forward on a rm's monetary prots, along
with a second eect that goes via its own spot market strategy, si. This joint eect is clearly
negative and has a deterministic component and a random component. The deterministic
component,  bxi=2, constitutes a negative price eect that is independent of the number of
rms. A rm that puts one unit more in the forward market cuts its spot sales by half a
unit (see equation (14)), so its total sales increase. This results in a fall in the spot market
price, which is anticipated by the speculators and therefore the forward price falls too.20
This own price eect dampens the incentives to put futures in the market, which explains
why a risk-neutral monopolist would choose not to engage in forward contracting at all (see
Tirole, 2006, p. 216-17). Since this eect is always negative no matter the number of rms,
it is also true that a risk-neutral oligopolist would opt out of the contract market (Hughes
and Kao, 1997).
The random component explains the risk-hedging motive. Note that a rm that increases
its contract cover away from zero lowers its exposure to demand shocks by =(n + 1) (see
equation (20)). This random component is negatively correlated with  and so is the marginal
utility from monetary prot (since prot increases in  and the utility function is concave).
As a result, the covariance between marginal utility and marginal prot is positive, giving
rise to the risk-hedging incentive of selling forward contracts. When contracts cannot be
observed by the market participants, the optimal contract cover of a rm i is the outcome
of trading o the (positive) risk-hedging motive against the (negative) price eect.
When forward positions are easily observable by the rms, or can easily be inferred from the


















f()d = 0 (21)
In this case there is a third, strategic, eect of selling futures. This eect also has a deter-
ministic component and a random component. Suppose the rms are risk-neutral. By the
strategic eect, a rm that puts units in the forward market positively aects its prot via
the spot market strategies of the rival rms. This gives rm i an incentive to sell forward,
since by doing so it benets from rival rms' cuts in their spot sales (Allaz and Vila, 1993).
The additional random term has a positive sign and this implies that it works counter to the
risk-hedging eect discussed above. This is because, since the rival rms cut their spot sales,
the eect of putting one unit forward is less eective at lowering exposure to price shocks.
20The fall in the forward price originates from the assumption that speculators observe the forward quan-
tities (Ferreira, 2006). Since they anticipate a higher total quantity to be delivered when the spot market
closes, they correspondingly lower the prices they bid for the quantities on sale in the futures market.
12However, the aggregate random component in equation (21) is still negative and decreasing
in n. This tells us that rms have an incentive to hedge against risk also in a transparent
forward market, but that the marginal gains from doing it become smaller the more rms
are around.
Obviously, the importance of the strategic motive depends on the likelihood forward positions
are learnt by the players. Moreover, because the risk-hedging and the strategic eects of
selling forward on a rm's expected utility are intertwined, it is now clear why it is dicult
to disentangle them using data from the eld. In the remainder of the paper, our main focus
will be on the equilibrium inverse hedge ratio of an individual rm i, dened as total-to-
forward-sales (or qi=xi) ratio. Though the forward and the spot sales of an individual rm
cannot be computed explicitly, we now show how one can easily derive the stochastic process
of a rms's inverse hedge ratio. This ratio has useful properties that we will exploit in the
empirical application.
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As can been seen from equation (24), the inverse hedge ratio is normally distributed. The
following proposition discusses some more properties of the equilibrium inverse hedge ratio.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the mean of the inverse hedge ratio of a rm i, dened as
total-to-forward-sales ratio, is given by
 i 
(n + 1)2(n + 1 + (n   1)) + 2(3(n + 1)   (n   1))
i2
b




This mean of the inverse hedge ratio,  i, satises the following properties:
(i) It is independent of the demand intercept parameter a and of the rm marginal cost ci,
13but increases in the demand slope parameter b.
(ii) It decreases as the risk-aversion parameter of the rm i goes up, or as demand volatility
2 increases.
(iii) It decreases as the probability that forward positions are observed  increases
(iv) There exists a critical parameter ~  such that: For all   ()~ ,  i increases (decreases)
in the number of rms n.
Moreover, if rms are symmetric (ci = c;i =  for all i), the variance of the inverse hedge
ratio of the rms decreases in a,  and 2, and increases in c, b and in .
The proof is in Appendix A.
The main properties of the inverse hedge ratio as stated in Proposition 1 need some further
explanation. First, the inverse hedge ratio does not depend on the demand parameter a and
the cost parameter ci. This means that rms with similar risk aversion hedge in the same
way on average, no matter how much they dier in their marginal cost of production. In
addition, it is interesting to see that inverse hedge ratios in periods of demand expansion
are similar to those in periods of demand contraction. This result, of course, rests on the
linearity assumptions of the demand and cost functions. However, it should be seen as a
reasonable approximation that is useful because it allows us to estimate the model without
cost and demand data.
Inverse hedge ratios go down when rms becomes more risk averse, when demand uncertainty
increases, or when the transparency of the forward market goes up. The former two results
are driven by the risk-hedging rationale: the higher the degree of risk aversion (or the greater
the uncertainty), the more a rm wants to hedge in the forward market instead of selling
spot. The latter is explained by the strategic motive, since a high level of contract cover is
worth more to a rm the more convincing the commitment is.
The most interesting feature of the inverse hedge ratio, at least for our purposes, is that
whether rm entry/exit has an upward or downward eect on this ratio depends on the
extent to which the forward market is transparent. If the futures market is relatively opaque
and rivals' futures contracts go often unobserved, the strategic eect is hardly present and
the contract cover of a rm trades o the the risk-hedging eect against the price eect. In
that situation the incentive to hedge against demand shocks becomes weaker (see equation
(20)) if more suppliers enter the market, which pushes up the inverse hedge ratio of an
individual rm. This is because demand uncertainty is revealed before the spot market
opens and therefore the demand shock is partly absorbed by the rivals' spot strategies. As
a result, the residual demand of a particular rm at the spot stage is less susceptible to
demand shocks the higher the number of competitors. By contrast, the price eect appears
not to depend on the number of competitors (see equation (20)). Therefore, it is clear that
when the forward market is relatively obscure, inverse hedge ratios increase in the number
of suppliers. For the extreme case of  = 0 we in fact get:
 i( = 0) =
6i2 + b(n + 1)2
4i2 : (26)
14which goes up in n.
If the futures market is more transparent and the contract positions of the rivals are regularly
observed, in addition to the risk-hedging eect and the price eect, the strategic eect plays
a signicant role. Note from equation (21) that the strategic eect becomes more prominent
as more players are active in the market. This is because for a rm the marginal gains from
aecting its rivals' spot market strategies are higher the more competitors it faces. While the
risk-hedging and the price eect (weakly) decrease as the number of competitors increases,
we show that the strategic eect may have a dominating inuence. For the extreme situation
 = 1, we obtain:





b(n2   1) + 2i2; (27)
which clearly decreases in n.
As shown in Proposition 1, for intermediate cases, the relationship between the number of
rms and the inverse hedge ratio depends on how likely it is that forward positions will be
observed. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The inverse hedge ratio and the number of rms (i = 4, 2 = 1, b = 1)
3 Empirical application
We seek to answer the question whether rms sell futures for strategic reasons, for risk-
hedging considerations, or for both. If rms' forward positions were totally opaque to the
agents in the market, strategic reasons would not play any role and therefore the observed
inverse hedge ratios in the data would only be explained by risk-hedging considerations.
Answering this inquiry thus amounts to nding out the extent to which rms can observe
each other's forward sales. Or, in dierent words, guring out the ability of the players to
forecast correctly the aggregate position of the rivals' upon observing the forward price/index.
15If one were provided with rms' forward and spot sales data corresponding to various levels of
observability and risk, one could estimate the eects of these two factors on the hedge ratio.
The problem with this approach is that these variables are hard to measure. One could
for example gather data from dierent regional markets. Within-market price dispersion
could be used as a measure of price risk. However, it is not clear how to measure the
extent to which rms are capable of deducing deviations from changes in the forward price.
The analyst would have to make a priori assumptions about the observability parameter
. Instead, we propose to estimate the model in Section 2 structurally. We do this for the
Dutch wholesale market for natural gas. For this market, we have obtained the minimal
set of data: forward and spot sales, churn ratios and number of producers and wholesalers.
Before presenting the market under study and the data we have obtained, we discuss the
empirical approach. Our results can be found in Section 3.3.
3.1 Empirical strategy
The variable of interest is the inverse hedge ratio of an individual rm i. As shown above,
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Using individual rm level data on total quantities brought to the market, forward sales and
number of wholesalers, the system of equations in (29) can be tted to the data. Identi-
fying assumptions are that the slope of the demand function b and the demand volatility
parameter  are constant over the sample period; moreover, we assume that variation in the
number of players n is exogenous.21 Since these equations are non-linear in the parameters
of interest, we will apply non-linear least squares (NLS). Notice that the parameters i;
and b cannot be separately identied. However, with the appropriate (rm-level) data, one
could estimate relative risk-aversion parameters across rms, i.e. i=j. The identication of
these parameters would stem from variation in the hedge ratios of the dierent rms. If some
rms were systematically seen to hedge more than others, this would provide information
on the extent to which the former rms have greater risk-aversion than the latter.
The identication of the observability parameter  stems from variation in the number of
wholesalers n. As shown above, when forward positions are relatively transparent to the
21It may be argued that the number of players is determined jointly with the hedge ratios. Economic
theory suggest the demand and cost parameters as clear determinants of n. If this dependence is not clearly
controlled for by the variation in the forward sales of a rm xi, which clearly depend on a and ci, then an
endogeneity problem would arise. To deal with this issue, we add a free-entry condition that is estimated
jointly with equation (29) (see Section 4.2).
16rms, the model predicts that an individual rm responds to entry by decreasing its inverse
hedge ratio. By contrast, if rms' forward sales are relatively opaque and rivals' rarely
observe them, then an individual rm increases its inverse hedge ratio as a response to
entry. It is precisely this dierential eect of entry that enables the identication of the
observability parameter  using data containing variation in the number of players.
Unfortunately, due to condentiality reasons, individual rm level data are not publicly
available in the market we study and we have only been able to obtain aggregate forward
and spot sales. To work with this type of data, we proceed by aggregating at the market
level. For this we need to assume that all rms have similar risk aversion parameters, i.e.,
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where  () is the hedge ratio as dened in Proposition 1 for symmetric rms. We t this
equation to the data by applying NLS. The regression results, shown in Section 3.3, tell us
whether rms use forward contracts for risk-hedging purposes, for strategic reasons, or for
both. We now give some details on the market we study and the data set.
3.2 The data
We use data from the Dutch wholesale market for natural gas. For the purpose of this paper,
these data are very useful because forward contracts have not been imposed by the regulator
so they can be considered endogenous to the market process.
As in many other countries, traditionally, gas supply in the Dutch wholesale market was
controlled by a single integrated network company {the NV Nederlandse Gasunie.22 Gasunie
did not only own the transmission network, but also had control over the national distribution
pipelines and the gas supplies. Gas originated from the Dutch gas elds or was imported
from foreign producers.23 Gasunie sold the gas to industrial customers and distribution
companies.
22Gasunie was a joint venture between De Staatsmijnen (DSM), Shell, Esso and the Dutch State.
23The sources of supply are similar in recent days. In 2008 there were 35 production elds and 17 import
entry points (GTS, 2008). The bulk of Dutch gas production takes place in the Groningen gas eld. After the
discovery of this eld in 1959, the Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij (NAM), a joint venture between Shell
and Esso, obtained a governmental concession to explore and exploit this gas eld. The NAM was however
obliged to sell all the gas extracted from the Groningen eld (and other small elds in the Netherlands) to
Gasunie.
17Market deregulation in the Netherlands started back in the late 1990s with the Price Trans-
parency Directive, but gained full momentum with the First Gas Directive of the European
Union in 1998. This ruling abolished import monopolies, forced the opening of markets
and imposed the accounting unbundling of vertically integrated network companies. The
Second Gas Directive of the European Union in 2003 furthered the liberalisation process by
requiring full market opening, regulated third party network access, regulated or negotiated
access to storage and legal unbundling of integrated network companies. As a consequence
of this directive, Gasunie was split up into two independent companies: Gas Transporta-
tion Services (GTS), which controls the national transmission network, and Gasterra, which
is engaged in gas wholesaling. The second directive also required the creation of national
energy regulators.
To attain a well-functioning wholesale gas market in The Netherlands, the Title Transfer
Facility (TTF) was created in 2003. The TTF is a virtual trading hub that oers market
parties/shippers the possibility to buy and sell gas that is already injected into the national
gas transmission grid, or for which transportation capacity has already been booked. Thanks
to the TTF gas can easily change hands before it is extracted at a specic local or export
exit point. This triggered the entry of new players into the Dutch market.24 The TTF made
the emergence of gas exchanges possible. APX Gas NL B.V. runs an exchange for spot
contracts. At APX, market parties can trade standardized contracts for gas delivery one day
ahead and within the same day. ENDEX N.V. runs an exchange for a variety of gas futures
contracts.25 At the end of 2008 ENDEX N.V. was taken over by APX B.V., which is also
the owner of APX Gas NL B.V.
The TTF allows gas buyers in the wholesale market to hold a portfolio of dierent types of
gas products. Long-term take-or-pay contracts used to be the dominant contract type in the
industry. Nowadays a buyer can buy gas on a short term basis at the trading hub. Since gas
demand typically has a seasonal pattern, rms gain in exibility by participating in this new
market. Over the years we have witnessed an increase in volumes traded at the TTF. By
2008, a substantial share of 20 percent of gas that ows through the GTS transport system
reached the trading hub. The Dutch regulator expects that in the future the TTF will be
suciently liquid so as to oer market participants all the hedging opportunities they need.26
Our data set consists of a substantial fraction (approximately 75 percent) of all forward and
spot contracts traded at the Dutch TTF for the period from April 2003 until June 2008.
24New players include new wholesale companies such as Gaz de France, BP, EON, Gazprom, RWE, Statoil,
Total, etc., as well as new nancial players such as JP Morgan, The Royal Bank of Scotland, BNP Paribas,
Morgan Stanley, Citygroup, Barclays Bank, etc. By contrast, there has not been much entry of new retailers
in the TTF. What has happened is that the existing distribution companies (Essent, Nuon, Eneco, GDF
Suez, etc.) have become active outside their traditional territories as well as abroad.
25The minimum length of a contract is one month and the maximum length is one (calendar) year.
Contracts can range from a month ahead to three years ahead of delivery. In Appendix D we provide more
details on the types of contracts traded at the TTF.
26Most of the TTF-traded gas is high-caloric, which is gas that is mostly used for industrial and exporting
purposes. High-caloric can also be converted into low-caloric gas, which is the gas intended for domestic
residential usage.
18These data were provided by the company ICIS Heren.27 In addition, we obtained data from
the transport operator GTS on the number of wholesalers active every month, on the daily
churn rates and on the total daily volumes.28 Unfortunately, we do not have information
on the identity of the trading partners so we are unable to perform the analysis at the rm
level. As explained earlier, if rms do not dier much in their aversion to risk, they will
hedge in a similar fashion, even if there exist signicant cost dierences across them.
Transactions can be either facilitated by brokers, or exchange-based, or the outcome of
bilateral negotiations. All these three types of transactions are included in our data set, but
we cannot distinguish between them in the sense that we cannot tell whether a transaction is
over-the-counter or has occurred at the centralized exchange ENDEX. As said before, there
are several types of contracts traded at TTF. For a given trading day, we are interested, on
the one hand, in the total volume of gas delivered and, on the other hand, in the amount
that has been sold forward. To compute all the gas delivered in a given date, we sum all the
quantities specied in dierent contracts that call for delivery on such a day. To compute
how much of this volume is contracted forward, we need to make an assumption about the
nature of uncertainty in this market. We make the assumption that only day-ahead and
within-day contracts form the spot market so the rest of the contracts are considered futures
contracts.29
To be clear, suppose that in year 2003, three products have been traded: (i) a forward
contract traded on November 3 that calls for delivery of 720 MegaWatt hour (MWh) each
day in December 2003, (ii) a day-ahead contract traded on December 6, 2003 for delivery
of 4,320 MWh the next day, and (iii) a spot contract traded on December 20, 2003 for
delivery of 1,440 MWh the same day. Then, except for two days, December 7 and 20,
for each day in December 2003 the delivery volume is 720 MWh. On December 7, the total
delivery volume equals (720+4,320=)5,040 MWh while on December 20, the delivery volume
is (720+1,440=) 2,160 MWh. As a result, the hedge ratio is 1 for all days of December 2003
except for December 7, with an inverse hedge ratio of 8, and December 20, with an inverse
hedge ratio of 3.
One diculty of the data at hand is that a substantial part of the transactions we observe
concerns contracts that are traded with or between speculators. Since nancial traders
27ICIS Heren (http://www.icis.com/heren/) is a leading specialized information provider for energy mar-
kets. The company publishes price assessments, indices, news and analysis for various energy markets. ICIS
Heren gathers daily price and quantity information from brokers and directly from the participants in the
industry via telephone calls.
28The participants in the industry must make nominations to the transport operator once the gas changes
hands. In this way, the transport operator receives the necessary information to compute total traded
volumes and the churn rates. Using the data on total volumes delivered at the TTF, we estimate that our
data contains well above 50 percent of the total market.
29We have discussed the validity of this assumption with participants in this industry. At the margin,
the main driver of demand is temperature. Therefore, if any, the main source of uncertainty here is due to
temperature uctuations. According to the participants, the weather predictions one day ahead are quite
accurate. Moreover, within-day and day-ahead deals are conducted at one and the same exchange (APX)
while contracts with longer duration are traded on a dierent exchange (ENDEX). This suggests that the
industry considers day-ahead and within-day contracts as being of similar type.
19must have zero net positions before delivery, many of the contracts we see are re-trades
and do not involve volumes that are nally brought to the market. Fortunately, we can
deal with this issue using data on churn rates (net-to-gross-volume ratios). Churn rates are
reported by GTS. These rates do not distinguish between forward trades and spot market
trades. Obviously, actual churn rates for spot market transactions are much lower than those
corresponding to forward trades, since the length of time to resell contracts is rather short
in the spot market. In what follows, we assume forward transactions have a churn rate equal
to the churn rate reported by the GTS; for spot market trades, we assume the churn rate
equals one.30 Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics of our data and Figure 2 displays
the forward sales adjusted for the churn rate, as well as the spot market sales. 31
Figure 2: Forward market and spot market sales
The descriptive statistics reveal four interesting aspects of the data. First, volumes traded
at the TTF have gone up a great deal.32 In fact, by 2008 the TTF became the second largest
30In dierent words, we are assuming speculators do not take positions during the time the spot market
is open. If we had information on the identity of the traders, we could check the validity of this assumption.
31Besides data on traded volumes, Table 1 also contains information on forward prices and spot prices.
The forward price indices we report concern monthly contracts. We compute four dierent forward price
indices: the price index obtained using all transactions that take place (1) more than one month before the
month of delivery; (2) in the rst half of the month preceding delivery; (3) in the last half of the month
before delivery (4) in the last two days before delivery. In Table 1, we only report the index for monthly
contracts traded in the rst half of the month preceding the delivery month. The other indices show a very
similar pattern. Spot prices are determined by computing an index for all the day-ahead deals included in
our data set.
32Currently net volumes in the TTF are approximately equal to the total supplies of natural gas to large
industrial users in The Netherlands, including the electricity generating companies. This is about 10% of the
total amount of gas that enters the Dutch pipeline system (about 43% of the gas that enters the Netherlands
is `transit' gas, i.e., exports to other countries).
20Year Variable Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
2003 Wholesalers 9 11 10.11 0.93
Wholesalers 80% 4 6 5.22 0.67
Spot (GWh) 63.96 145.54 93.25 34.05
Forward (GWh) 193.92 1646.64 856.91 491.32
Churn rate 1.42 2.67 1.92 0.41
Net forward (GWh) 136.71 712.28 419.61 172.42
Inv. hedge ratio 1.11 1.49 1.26 0.12
Forward price 10.10 15.09 11.56 1.88
Spot price 8.42 14.26 11.08 2.03
2004 Wholesalers 11 15 13 1.48
Wholesalers 80% 5 8 6.5 0.90
Spot (GWh) 133.44 561.84 353.82 137.08
Forward (GWh) 1512 3494.02 2455.11 638.83
Churn rate 2.04 3.15 2.65 0.37
Net forward (GWh) 624.38 1281.44 932.05 220.23
Inv. hedge ratio 1.14 1.73 1.4 0.19
Forward price 10.34 14.78 12.06 1.60
Spot price 10.67 14.88 11.84 1.30
2005 Wholesalers 14 20 17.17 1.90
Wholesalers 80% 7 10 8.58 0.9
Spot (GWh) 433.92 866.88 599.64 126.26
Forward (GWh) 6479.28 10911.60 8322.37 1183.82
Churn rate 2.69 3.34 3.09 0.18
Net forward (GWh) 2220.24 3622.44 2699.18 397.34
Inv. hedge ratio 1.18 1.33 1.22 0.04
Forward price 13.48 22.09 16.32 2.61
Spot price 14.20 23.91 16.66 2.99
2006 Wholesalers 21 24 22.42 1.24
Wholesalers 80% 10 11 10.25 0.45
Spot (GWh) 621.60 2397.68 1022.42 487.18
Forward (GWh) 13030.15 19472.21 15788.77 2150.13
Churn rate 2.83 4.23 3.29 0.41
Net forward (GWh) 4166.79 5615.75 4805.13 471.61
Inv. hedge ratio 1.14 1.43 1.21 0.08
Forward price 19.35 27.35 22.65 2.92
Spot price 14.18 28.07 20.82 3.95
2007 Wholesalers 25 28 25.67 0.98
Wholesalers 80% 11 14 12.75 1.06
Spot (GWh) 684.34 2027.78 1130.29 353.96
Forward (GWh) 18279.17 26240.35 22141.36 2734.63
Churn rate 2.84 4.66 3.77 0.56
Net forward (GWh) 5033.53 7520.37 5934.65 732.21
Inv. hedge ratio 1.11 1.35 1.19 0.07
Forward price 10.03 25.56 14.99 5.28
Spot price 9.16 22.87 14.71 4.93
2008 Wholesalers 28 29 28.67 0.52
Wholesalers 80% 12 12 12 0
Spot (GWh) 1310.18 2910.58 1875.08 603.48
Forward (GWh) 28625.40 35767.02 33389.21 2531.02
Churn rate 3.22 3.57 3.37 0.12
Net forward (GWh) 8900.29 10797.62 9911.70 659.24
Inv. hedge ratio 1.13 1.29 1.19 0.06
Forward price 21.79 25.94 24.26 1.57
Spot price 22.73 26.64 24.70 1.44
Notes: Year 2003 averaged over 9 months. Year 2008 over 6 months.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (monthly averages)
21gas trading hub in Europe, both in terms of traded volume and net (physical) ow.33 A rst
explanation for this phenomenon is that, as compared to for example the Zeebrugge hub in
Belgium, the TTF benets from the absence of third-party access exemptions to the Dutch
pipeline system. A second issue is that the entry/exit points to the Dutch pipeline system are
well interconnected and this allows for the TTF to function as a virtual hub, which relaxes
the physical constraints imposed by the capacities of the various pipelines. Finally, adding
to the attractiveness of the Dutch trading hub as compared to signing long-term contracts is
the opening of the BBL pipeline in 2006, which connects the Netherlands and the UK. The
BBL pipeline allows TTF-traded gas to be shipped to the UK and this brings TTF prices
down and more in line with UK prices.
A second aspect of the data is that a signicant part of the total volume traded at the TTF
is hedged (between 60 and 90 %). It is also remarkable that the hedge ratio has increased
over time but, by no means, it has changed by the order of magnitude the volumes have
changed. Furthermore, we note that the standard deviation of the inverse hedge ratio seems
to have gone down over the sample period. The latter two observations appear to be in line
with our model of rm behavior (inverse hedge ratios are mean independent of the strength
of the demand parameter and have a standard deviation negatively correlated with it, see
Proposition 1). Finally, it can be seen from Table 1 that forward prices and spot prices are
closely linked, though the former are in general somewhat higher than the latter. 34
As discussed earlier, identication of the key parameters of the model requires variation in
the number of wholesalers operating in the market. The TTF is a market where in fact
there has been a steady increase in the number of participants. However, from our data on
transactions we cannot extract the number of wholesalers since we do not have information
on the identity of the traders engaged in a transaction. We obtained data on the number of
active wholesalers in a given month from the GTS.35 Since some wholesalers are probably
very small and have no market power whatsoever, we also asked for the number of active
wholesalers making up for 60 and 80 percent of total delivery. Figure 3 shows the evolution of
the total number of active wholesalers, as well as the development of the number of suppliers
that account for more than 60 and 80 percent of the gas delivered in the TTF. Note that not
only more gas wholesalers have entered the TTF in the period under analysis, but also that,
as time has elapsed, the 60 and 80 percent market share has become distributed over more
rms. This suggests that the supply of gas has become less concentrated in the Netherlands.
33The National Balancing Point (NBP) in the UK, introduced in 1996, has long since been the most liquid
hub in Europe.
34Using the four dierent forward price indices, we perform an ANOVA test of the null hypothesis that
spot and forward prices are statistically similar to each other. For three out of the four forward price indices,
the hypothesis cannot be rejected (the only index that appears to be signicantly dierent than the spot
price index is the one computed from transactions that take place longer than a month before delivery).
35To conduct transactions at the TTF, participants must rst subscribe with the TTF either as wholesalers,
industrial customers, retailers or pure traders. The subscription can be made for a single gas month or for
a full calendar year. Subscribing involves the payment of some xed fees and, in addition, traders have to
pay some variable fees for the volumes traded.
22Figure 3: Number of wholesalers active at TTF
Given the monthly nature of our data on the number of active wholesalers, we compute
aggregate monthly delivery forward and spot volumes and conduct the analysis using 63
monthly observations. To get a rst impression of whether gas wholesalers trade forward
contracts for strategic reasons, we pool together the months in which the number of active
suppliers that serve 80% of the market is the same and compute the average hedge ratio
for those months. We then regress the hedge ratio on a constant and on the number of
wholesalers. Figure 4 displays the relation between the number of wholesalers trading at the
TTF and the average ratio of interest. The dots in the gure represent the average ratio for
a given number of wholesale rms in our data set, while the dashed line shows the estimated
relation between the number of wholesalers and the inverse hedge ratio. The results of the
regression indicate that this relation is negative, which, according to the theoretical model,
suggests that forward contracts are used as strategic instruments.36 Since this regression does
not allow us to learn the extent to which the players' positions are observed, we proceed by
estimating the model structurally.
3.3 Results
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where t indexes the time period (month) and  and  
2
b are the parameters of interest.
The NLS regression results are summarized in Table 2.
36More precisely, we estimate by OLS the model ^  n = +n+un, where ^  n is the average inverse hedge
ratio for a given number of wholesale rms, n the number of wholesalers and un the usual error term. The
estimates become ^  = 1:36 and ^  =  0:01, with t-statistics being equal to 21:97 and  1:66, respectively.





Notes: n equal to wholesalers 80% of market
 Signicant at the 1 percent level
Table 2: NLS regression results
As can be seen from Table 2, the estimate for the observability parameter, ^ , is equal to
0.83 and is highly signicant. We view this result as a rst piece of evidence that strategic
considerations play an important role in explaining the hedge ratios observed in the data. As
said above, this can be interpreted as if rms attached approximately 80 percent probability
to the event that their forward positions are correctly forecasted by the rival rms upon
observing the forward price. Seen from the perspective that most transactions at the TTF
occur OTC, we nd the result that the forward market is quite transparent interesting. It
actually means that the market by itself is able to activate the role of forward sales as a
commitment device.
The estimate for the risk aversion parameter, ^ , turns out not to be signicant. This suggests
that there is not clear evidence that risk-hedging is a key factor explaining observed hedge
ratios in the Dutch natural gas market.37
The previous regression assumes demand volatility is constant over the sample period. If
37We have also estimated equation (32) for the case where n equals the number of all active wholesalers.
We obtain similar results. The estimate for  is equal to 0.76 and is signicant at the 1 percent level, while
, in this case becoming nearly zero, is again non-signicant.
24demand has become more (or less) volatile as time has elapsed, not controlling properly for
such variation may lead to some form of omitted variable bias. Of course, changes in 2 are
controlled for by changes in the forward sales. However, since 2 aects the expression (32)
directly, this control may be insucient.
To explore this issue, we rst construct a measure of demand volatility using spot market
prices and use it to increase the variation in the data. Using equation (24), and rearranging,
we can write the equilibrium spot price as follows:







From this expression we can compute a measure of demand volatility:

2




To determine the monthly volatility of demand shocks, we thus need some measure for price
variability. For this, we rst proxy daily spot prices by computing a weighted price index for
day-ahead contracts. Then, monthly demand volatility, 2
t, is obtained by calculating the
variance of the spot prices within a given month and multiplying this measure by (nt+1)2.38
Figure 5 plots (the natural logarithm of) our estimate for the monthly demand volatility.
The graph shows that demand has become more volatile over the sample period. This should
explain part of the observed decrease in the inverse hedge ratios and, as a result, we would
expect to obtain a lower estimate of the transparency parameter . The new estimates of
equation (32) are in Table 3. In fact, the new estimate of the transparency parameter  is
somewhat lower and continues to be highly signicant. Again we do not obtain signicant





Notes: n equal to wholesalers 80% of market
 Signicant at the 1 percent level
Table 3: NLS regression with demand volatility measure
It is conceivable that forward market transparency has increased over time. First, one can
imagine that market participants' ability to interpret price signals has improved as time has
elapsed. Second, it is also reasonable to believe that the quality and the quantity of the price
38Notice that using ex-post price variation as a proxy for demand uncertainty relies on the assumption
that rms have ex-ante perfect foresight about future (spot) prices. Campa and Goldberg (1993) use this
approach to study the eect of exchange rate volatility on entry of foreign rms in the US market during
the 1980s.
25Figure 5: measure of demand uncertainty
indices available in the market has increased over time. Price information is now provided
by information agencies such as ICIS Heren and Argus Media Ltd.,39 brokers' associations
such as LEBA40 as well as the centralized marketplace ENDEX. Finally, the share of trades
conducted (or cleared) at the gas exchange (vis- a-vis OTC) has increased over time and, since
the exchange may be considered a more transparent marketplace than the OTC market, this
adds to the supposition that the forward market as a whole has become more transparent.
If this conjecture is borne by the data, we should observe an increase in the observability
parameter  over time.
To test this learning hypothesis, we introduce year dummies into the empirical model in
(32). We continue to use the proxy for changes in demand volatility. The new estimates
are given in Table 4. The results suggest that wholesalers' ability to infer deviations from
equilibrium play has indeed increased over time.
We have searched for explanations for the result that there is no evidence that risk-hedging is
an important factor to explain the observed inverse hedge ratios. One possible explanation is
that being the strategic eect present and relatively strong, the incentives to hedge become
rather weak. In fact, when  is close to one, and for the rm numbers in our data (from
4 to 14 players), the share of the hedged quantity in total sales is already relatively large
so the residual demand of a rm is quite low. This makes it rather dicult to precisely
estimate the risk aversion parameter. To substantiate this observation, we plot the t of the
estimated model (with and without a proxy for 2 ), along with those which would prevail if
the wholesalers were risk-neutral ( = 0:01) or very risk averse ( = 100;000).41 The graph
illustrates that the inverse hedge ratios predicted by the dierent levels of risk aversion are
39www.argusmedia.com
40London Energy Brokers' Association (www.leba.org.uk)
41To plot the t of the regression with a proxy for demand volatility included, we take the sample mean










Notes: n equal to wholesalers 80% of market
 Signicant at the 1 percent level
Table 4: NLS regression with demand volatility measure and year dummies.
somewhat similar; as a result, one would need a very rich data set to precisely estimate the
risk aversion parameter.
Figure 6: Fit of the model
Finally, we note that most TTF-trade is on high-caloric gas, for which demand is mainly
industrial and for exporting purposes and therefore less subject to unpredictable weather
shocks (see NMa/DTe, 2007). The other type of gas sold at the TTF is low-caloric gas.
Demand for this type of gas is weather-driven to a larger extent because this type of gas is
meant for household usage; however, due to limited conversion capacity, most of the low-
caloric gas delivered in the Netherlands does not pass the TTF.
274 Discussion and further results
4.1 Uncertain spot market
In the model studied above, we have assumed that rms operate in the spot market in
the absence of uncertainty. Therefore, we have modeled a market where rms observe the
demand shocks before they decide how much gas to put in the spot market. Arguably, the
demand may still remain uncertain at that moment. In such a case, rms cannot condition
their spot strategies on the demand realizations. To see whether our results depend on this
assumption, we now develop a model in which rms do not observe price shocks before the
spot market opens. Of course, as before, the dierence between the forward and the spot
market is that at the forward stage the rms can lock-in a price for their forward quantities,
while the price received for their spot quantities is random.
In this new setting, a rm i that chooses its spot market strategy si aims at maximizing the







To simplify the derivations, let us focus right away on the symmetric case where all rms are
equally risk averse and have similar marginal costs of production. Given a forward strategy





a   c   bxi   b(n   1)x i
b(n + 1) + 2 (35)
where xi denotes rm i's forward sales and x i refers to the forward sales of rms other than
i. In this case, the conditional reduced-form equilibrium prot is

I=1





i + (f   c)xi (36)
where f, as above, denotes the forward price.
When forward positions of the rival rms are not observable, I = 0, the equilibrium spot




(2b + 2)(a   c   b(n   1)^ x i) + b2(n   1)^ xi   b(b(n + 1) + 2)xi
(2b + 2)(b(n + 1) + 2)
(37)
where ^ xi denotes rival rms' conjecture about the position of rm i, and ^ x i refers to the
conjectures about the forward positions of rms other than i. The equilibrium payo in this
case of no observability equals

I=0





i + (f   c)xi (38)
42Details of the derivations are available from the authors upon request.
28At the forward market stage, a rm i picks its amount of forward sales xi to maximize its
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where we have already imposed the symmetry of equilibrium strategies and the correctness
of equilibrium conjectures conditions, i.e. xi = xi  = ^ x i = ^ x i. Solving for the equilibrium
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Building on this expression, we can state the following result:
Proposition 2 Suppose that rms do not observe the demand shocks before the spot market
opens. Then the inverse hedge ratio of a rm i is deterministic and given by
^   
(n   1) + (n + 1 +
2
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The inverse hedge ratio ^   is independent of the demand intercept parameter a and of the
rm marginal cost c, increases in the demand slope parameter b, decreases in  and in 2,
decreases in  and is (weakly) monotonically decreasing in the number of rms n.
Compared to the inverse hedge ratios in Proposition 1, we see that when spot market strate-
gies cannot be adapted to accommodate the demand shocks, inverse hedge ratios are always
(weakly) decreasing in the number of players. The intuition behind this result is as follows.
As before, the incentives of a rm to sell forward are governed by a price eect, a risk-hedging
eect and a strategic eect. The price eect is again constant in the number of rms. Since
rms cannot adapt their spot strategies to demand uctuations, the risk-hedging eect turns
out to be independent of the number of rms too. In fact, when forward positions are not
observable, the inverse hedge ratios are constant in the number of players:














When the forward market is not totally opaque so that the positions of the rms are some-
what observable, the strategic commitment role of selling forward leads rms to sell a higher
output in the forward market the higher the number of players is. As a result, by the latter
eect, inverse hedge ratios fall in n. When the market is fully transparent, in fact we obtain:











29which clearly decreases in n.
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where "t is an error term. The NLS regression results are given in Table 5. The results
are similar in that the estimate for the observability parameter is relatively high and highly
signicant. The estimate for the risk aversion parameter is again non-signicant. The
relatively low R2 indicates that this model does less well in explaining the observed variation





Notes: n equal to wholesalers 80% of market
 Signicant at the 1 percent level
Table 5: NLS regression results; no proxy for 2
To control for variation in demand volatility, as before, we add the appropriate proxy. In
this case, using the equilibrium equations we observe that 2
t = 2
pt, so we just take the
within-month variation in spot prices to proxy for the degree of demand uncertainty. The
new estimates of equation (43) are given in Table 6. Again, controlling for month-to-month
changes in demand volatility does not seriously aect the regression results; the estimate
for  is still highly signicant, while the estimate for  seems not to be able to explain any





Notes: n equal to wholesalers 80% of market
 Signicant at the 1 percent level
Table 6: NLS regression with demand volatility measure
Finally, we look at the eects of including year dummies. The results are given in Table 7.
We see that the learning eect becomes less prominent than in the model we estimate in
Section 3.3.
In sum, we conclude that our results in the main body of the paper are robust to this change










Notes: n equal to wholesalers 80% of market
 Signicant at the 1 percent level
Table 7: NLS regression with demand volatility measure and year dummies.
before they supply gas in the spot market or not, we nd that strategic considerations are
important at explaining the observed hedge ratios in the industry. By contrast, risk-hedging
appears not to have a large explanatory power. Comparing the t of the two models to
the data, we note that the model where spot strategies can be tuned to accommodate the
demand shocks has a much higher explanatory power.
In Figure 7 we show the t of the two models to the data, where we have used the estimates
reported in Tables 3 and 6 to construct the tted curves. Both models suggest that the
forward market is rather transparent, as the two estimated curves predict a fall in the ratio
of interest when more rms become active at the TTF. However, the model that does not
allow rms to condition their spot strategies on the realized demand shock predicts a higher
impact of rm entry on the inverse hedge ratio. This clearly gives a less good t of the data,
as can be concluded from comparing the R2 of both regressions.
4.2 Endogeneity of the number of wholesalers
In our main model we have assumed demand is linear and this has implied that the relation
to be estimated, equation (31), does not depend directly on the demand intercept parameter
and the marginal cost of the rms. As a result, data on demand and costs are not essential
to estimate equation (32) because changes in these variables are captured by changes in the
forward sales. A related implication is that the estimates reported in Tables 2, 3 and 4
assume that the number of wholesalers is exogenous.
If, instead, we had used other demand specications, the demand and cost parameters would
probably have entered directly in the equilibrium condition we want to estimate. Omitting
these variables, together with the fact that market protability {and therefore the number of
active wholesalers{ at the TTF depends on market characteristics such as demand strength,
the cost of supplying gas and the cost of entering the hub, raises the issue that the number
of active wholesalers is not exogenous from an econometrics point of view. To address
31Figure 7: Fit of the dierent models
this potential endogeneity issue, we propose to use a free-entry condition that we estimate
together with equation (32).
We assume that gas wholesalers enter the TTF till the last rm that enters makes zero prot
in expectation.43 By substituting the equilibrium forward sales, given by equation (22), into
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where F denotes a rm's cost of entry, 
 = !1!2, with
!1 =
(n + 1   (n   1))((n + 1)2 + 2)
(n + 1)2
!2 =
(n + 1)2(n + 1 + (n   1)) + 2(3(n + 1)   (n   1))
((n + 1)2(n + 1   (n   1)) + 2n(n2   1) + 2(n(3   ) + 1 + ))2
and the term  is a random shock normally distributed with mean equal to zero and standard
deviation given by .
To add the information provided by the free entry condition (44) we need additional data. As
a proxy for the demand intercept parameter a, we take monthly average prices of electricity
43While in our theoretical framework rms maximize expected utility once they have entered the market,
we assume that rms base their entry decision on expected prots. A practical reason for doing this is that
in case we let rm entry incentives be based on (expected) utility, the entry condition, which we are going
to exploit in the estimation, becomes very cumbersome to deal with. One theoretical validation for the
dissimilarity between rms' pre-entry and post-entry objectives is that market entry is decided upon by rm
owners, who are typically assumed to be risk neutral, while daily control is delegated to rm managers, who
are often considered as being risk-averse.
32spot contracts traded at the Dutch spot electricity exchange APX. In particular, we assume
at = a0 + a1et where a0;a1 are free parameters and et is the spot price of electricity in
period t.44 On the cost side, we consider the oil price as being informative for the marginal
production cost of a gas wholesaler. The rationale behind this is that prices in long-term
contracts between gas producers and wholesalers are often indexed by the oil price. We
therefore proxy the monthly marginal cost by ct = c0 + c1ot, where c0;c1 are free cost
parameters and ot is the monthly world oil price.
It is dicult to obtain information on entry costs. Wholesalers operating in the TTF have
to pay a xed fee of 1,263 Euros to register at the TTF for a single gas month. In addition,
if these wholesale rms also want to participate in the centralized exchanges, they have to
pay an extra xed fee of 2083 Euros per month.45



































































t;;b)   Ft (48)
and d = a0   c0 and  is a weighting parameter that is attached to the restrictions. Since
the degree of informativeness of the zero-prot conditions depends on the variability of these
restrictions, we set  equal to the ratio of the standard deviations of the two error terms in
(45),  = t=.46 The new regression results are summarized in Table 8.
The estimates of the key parameters do not change much if we include the stochastic zero-
prot conditions in the regressions. The strategic eect is again highly signicant, while the
risk-hedging motive is still non-signicant.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has proposed a methodology to investigate whether oligopolistic rms sell futures
for strategic reasons, for risk-hedging motives, or for both. Our empirical test builds on a
44As mentioned above, a great deal of the gas traded in the TTF is high-caloric gas whose main use is
in industrial applications such as the production of ammoniac as well as in the production of electricity.
45Next to the xed fee, participants pay a variable tari for each MWh traded in the TTF. These variable
fees are picked up by the constant c0 in our estimation.
46We conduct a feasible weighted NLS regression (see Greene, 1993, p. 209-211). The estimate of the




, which is the square root of the ratio of the sums of squared residuals.
33Parameter Estimate t-statistic
=b 3:5  105 0.00
 0.70 43.52
R2 = 0:68
Notes: n equal to wholesalers 80% of market
 Signicant at the 1 percent signicance level
Table 8: NLS regression results with endogenous n
theoretical model of the interaction of risk-averse rms that compete in futures and spot
markets. We nd that the eects of an increase in the number of players on the equilibrium
hedge ratio depend on the strategic role played by forward contracts. If forward sales play no
strategic role whatsoever, the inverse hedge ratio increases as more rms enter the market;
otherwise, the hedge ratio decreases. Firms hedge less if demand is very elastic and, as
expected, more risk averse rms have a greater propensity to hedge. These results serve to
structure our empirical research.
Using data from the Dutch wholesale market for natural gas where we observe the number
of producers and wholesalers, forward and spot sales, and churn rates, we nd evidence
that strategic reasons play an important role at explaining the observed rms' hedge ratios.
By contrast, the data do not support the idea that risk-hedging motives are an important
aspect behind the observed rms' hedge ratios. Seen under the perspective that most of
the forward transactions in the Dutch natural gas market occur OTC we think this is an
important result. We also document a learning eect, which is probably related to the
development of the market.
To increase transparency in the Dutch market for natural gas, the Dutch government did
set up ENDEX, an exchange for natural gas futures. A complete cost-benet analysis of
ENDEX is outside the scope of this paper but our study suggests that the OTC market by
itself provides the rms with sucient incentives to sell forward.47
Futures markets exist for a number of commodities, including electricity, natural gas, emis-
sion trading permits, copper, iron ore, aluminium, steel etc. Though we have applied our
model to the natural gas market in the Netherlands, we believe the general message of this
paper is broader. Our insights, and in particular our methodology to address the question
whether rms trade futures for strategic motives, should be applicable to other markets
where rms have signicant market power.
47The costs of operating a futures market are non-negligible even in a time where virtual market places
have displaced the more traditional physical hubs. In fact, personnel and ICT costs, along with the insurance
and nancial costs of dealing with default and other risks involved may render a marketplace unprotable.
ENDEX has been making losses for 5 out of its 6 or 7 years of existence. At the end of 2009, ENDEX was
taken over by the APX Group, which owns various platforms for spot trading of natural gas and electricity
in the NL, Belgium and the UK.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1.
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the inverse hedge ratio decreases as the rm is more risk averse. From this it readily follows
that inverse hedge ratios decrease in the uncertainty of the demand parameter and increases
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the inverse hedge ratio decreases in the probability forward positions are observed.
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Note that @ i=@n is dierentiable w.r.t. , which implies that @ i=@n is continuous in .
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for all n  2, b > 0, i > 0 and 2 > 0. Given that @ i=@n is continuous in , this implies
that @ =@n = 0 for at least one  2 (0;1).
Further, @ =@n = 0 has two solutions for , denoted by ~  and ~ 2:
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and
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where Z = b2(n+1)4 +4b(n+1)2(2n 1)i2 +42
i4. Now for all n  2, b > 0, i > 0 and
2 > 0, we have:
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< 0 and by continuity in , we have
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< 0 if 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> 0 if 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.
Finally, imposing symmetry across rms we can readily obtain the equilibrium forward sales
of a rm:
^ x =
2(a   c)(n2   1) + 2
2
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Observing the expression in equation 24, it is clear that the variance of the inverse hedge
ratio is 2=b2(n + 1)2^ x2, which clearly decreases in a,  and 2, and increases in c, b and in
.
Appendix B: TTF contracts
All contracts traded in the TTF call for physical delivery of natural gas at the GTS
transmission grid. Concerning forward transactions, the most prominent types of contracts
are the ones that are also eligible at ENDEX:48
• Single-month contracts; these contracts can be traded from three months ahead till the
expiration date, which is, with the exception of holidays, the penultimate working day
of the month that precedes the month of delivery. The monthly contract then moves
into delivery at the GTS transmission grid.
• Single-quarter contracts (quarters being dened as January-March, April-June, July-
September and October-December); trade in these contracts starts four quarters ahead
and continues till the moment the contract expires. For this product, the day of expi-
ration is the last but two working days of the last quarter before physical supply takes
place. After expiration, the quarterly contract converts into three monthly contracts.
• Single-season contracts (seasons being dened as April-September and October-March);
these contracts can change hands from four seasons ahead till the day of expiration,
which is the last but two working days of the season preceding the delivery period.
When the seasonal contract expires, it falls into three monthly contracts and one quar-
terly contract.
• Single-calendar-year contracts (calendar year being dened as January-December);
these contracts can be traded from three calendar years ahead till the moment of
48There exist also some contracts that can be traded OTC but not in the centralized exchange ENDEX.
Among them are the Balance-of-Month (BOM) and Working-Days-Next-Week (WDNW) contracts. These
kind of forward products constitute only a tiny share of the total number of the transactions in the TTF.
36expiration, which is the last but two working days of the last year before the gas is
delivered. After the contract expires, it cascades into three monthly contracts and
three quarterly contracts.
The minimum volume that can be specied in quarterly, seasonal and calendar contracts is
10 MWh/h; for monthly contracts, this minimum volume equals 30 MWh/h.
Next to forward contracts, participants also trade spot contracts at TTF. Two types of spot
market contracts can be distinguished:
• Day-ahead contracts; the trading market for these contracts opens two working days
before physical supply takes place and closes two hours prior to the start of delivery.
• Within-day contracts; these contracts can be traded from 26 hours prior to delivery
till two hours before the gas is physically supplied.
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